Files
orcs-code/src/__tests__/security-hardening.test.ts
Juan Camilo Auriti ae3b723f3b fix(security): harden project settings trust boundary + MCP sanitization (#789)
* fix(security): harden project settings trust boundary + MCP sanitization

- Sanitize MCP tool result text with recursivelySanitizeUnicode() to prevent
  Unicode injection via malicious MCP servers (tool definitions and prompts
  were already sanitized, but tool call results were not)
- Read sandbox.enabled only from trusted settings sources (user, local, flag,
  policy) — exclude projectSettings to prevent malicious repos from silently
  disabling the sandbox via .claude/settings.json
- Disable git hooks in plugin marketplace clone/pull/submodule operations
  with core.hooksPath=/dev/null to prevent code execution from cloned repos
- Remove ANTHROPIC_FOUNDRY_API_KEY from SAFE_ENV_VARS to prevent credential
  injection from project-scoped settings without trust verification
- Add ssrfGuardedLookup to WebFetch HTTP requests to block DNS rebinding
  attacks that could reach cloud metadata or internal services

Security: closes trust boundary gap where project settings could override
security-critical configuration. Follows the existing pattern established
by hasAllowBypassPermissionsMode() which already excludes projectSettings.

Co-authored-by: auriti <auriti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): remove unauthenticated file-based permission polling

Remove the legacy file-based permission polling from useSwarmPermissionPoller
that read from ~/.claude/teams/{name}/permissions/resolved/ — an unauthenticated
directory where any local process could forge approval files to auto-approve
tool uses for swarm teammates.

The file polling was dead code:
- The useSwarmPermissionPoller() hook was never mounted by any component
- resolvePermission() (the file writer) was never imported outside its module
- Permission responses are delivered exclusively via the mailbox system:
  Leader: sendPermissionResponseViaMailbox() → writeToMailbox()
  Worker: useInboxPoller → processMailboxPermissionResponse()

Changes:
- Remove file polling loop, processResponse(), and React hook imports from
  useSwarmPermissionPoller.ts (now a pure callback registry module)
- Mark 7 file-based functions as @deprecated in permissionSync.ts
- Add 4 regression tests verifying the removal

No exported functions removed — only deprecated. All 5 consumer modules
verified: they import only mailbox-based functions that remain unchanged.

---------

Co-authored-by: auriti <auriti@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-21 18:28:03 +08:00

191 lines
8.0 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Security hardening regression tests.
*
* Covers:
* 1. MCP tool result Unicode sanitization
* 2. Sandbox settings source filtering (exclude projectSettings)
* 3. Plugin git clone/pull hooks disabled
* 4. ANTHROPIC_FOUNDRY_API_KEY removed from SAFE_ENV_VARS
* 5. WebFetch SSRF protection via ssrfGuardedLookup
*/
import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test'
import { resolve } from 'path'
const SRC = resolve(import.meta.dir, '..')
const file = (relative: string) => Bun.file(resolve(SRC, relative))
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Fix 1: MCP tool result Unicode sanitization
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('MCP tool result sanitization', () => {
test('transformResultContent sanitizes text content', async () => {
const content = await file('services/mcp/client.ts').text()
// Tool definitions are already sanitized (line ~1798)
expect(content).toContain('recursivelySanitizeUnicode(result.tools)')
// Tool results must also be sanitized
expect(content).toMatch(
/case 'text':[\s\S]*?recursivelySanitizeUnicode\(resultContent\.text\)/,
)
})
test('resource text content is also sanitized', async () => {
const content = await file('services/mcp/client.ts').text()
expect(content).toMatch(
/recursivelySanitizeUnicode\(\s*`\$\{prefix\}\$\{resource\.text\}`/,
)
})
})
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Fix 2: Sandbox settings source filtering
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('Sandbox settings trust boundary', () => {
test('getSandboxEnabledSetting does not use getSettings_DEPRECATED', async () => {
const content = await file('utils/sandbox/sandbox-adapter.ts').text()
// Extract the getSandboxEnabledSetting function body
const fnMatch = content.match(
/function getSandboxEnabledSetting\(\)[^{]*\{([\s\S]*?)\n\}/,
)
expect(fnMatch).not.toBeNull()
const fnBody = fnMatch![1]
// Must NOT use getSettings_DEPRECATED (reads all sources including project)
expect(fnBody).not.toContain('getSettings_DEPRECATED')
// Must use getSettingsForSource for individual trusted sources
expect(fnBody).toContain("getSettingsForSource('userSettings')")
expect(fnBody).toContain("getSettingsForSource('policySettings')")
// Must NOT read from projectSettings
expect(fnBody).not.toContain("'projectSettings'")
})
})
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Fix 3: Plugin git hooks disabled
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('Plugin git operations disable hooks', () => {
test('gitClone includes core.hooksPath=/dev/null', async () => {
const content = await file('utils/plugins/marketplaceManager.ts').text()
// The clone args must disable hooks
const cloneSection = content.slice(
content.indexOf('export async function gitClone('),
content.indexOf('export async function gitClone(') + 2000,
)
expect(cloneSection).toContain("'core.hooksPath=/dev/null'")
})
test('gitPull includes core.hooksPath=/dev/null', async () => {
const content = await file('utils/plugins/marketplaceManager.ts').text()
const pullSection = content.slice(
content.indexOf('export async function gitPull('),
content.indexOf('export async function gitPull(') + 2000,
)
expect(pullSection).toContain("'core.hooksPath=/dev/null'")
})
test('gitSubmoduleUpdate includes core.hooksPath=/dev/null', async () => {
const content = await file('utils/plugins/marketplaceManager.ts').text()
const subSection = content.slice(
content.indexOf('async function gitSubmoduleUpdate('),
content.indexOf('async function gitSubmoduleUpdate(') + 1000,
)
expect(subSection).toContain("'core.hooksPath=/dev/null'")
})
})
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Fix 4: ANTHROPIC_FOUNDRY_API_KEY not in SAFE_ENV_VARS
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('SAFE_ENV_VARS excludes credentials', () => {
test('ANTHROPIC_FOUNDRY_API_KEY is not in SAFE_ENV_VARS', async () => {
const content = await file('utils/managedEnvConstants.ts').text()
// Extract the SAFE_ENV_VARS set definition
const safeStart = content.indexOf('export const SAFE_ENV_VARS')
const safeEnd = content.indexOf('])', safeStart)
const safeSection = content.slice(safeStart, safeEnd)
expect(safeSection).not.toContain('ANTHROPIC_FOUNDRY_API_KEY')
})
})
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Fix 5: WebFetch SSRF protection
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('WebFetch SSRF guard', () => {
test('getWithPermittedRedirects uses ssrfGuardedLookup', async () => {
const content = await file('tools/WebFetchTool/utils.ts').text()
expect(content).toContain(
"import { ssrfGuardedLookup } from '../../utils/hooks/ssrfGuard.js'",
)
// The axios.get call in getWithPermittedRedirects must include lookup
const fnSection = content.slice(
content.indexOf('export async function getWithPermittedRedirects('),
content.indexOf('export async function getWithPermittedRedirects(') +
1000,
)
expect(fnSection).toContain('lookup: ssrfGuardedLookup')
})
})
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Fix 6: Swarm permission file polling removed (security hardening)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('Swarm permission file polling removed', () => {
test('useSwarmPermissionPoller hook no longer exists', async () => {
const content = await file(
'hooks/useSwarmPermissionPoller.ts',
).text()
// The file-based polling hook must not exist — it read from an
// unauthenticated resolved/ directory where any local process could
// forge approval files.
expect(content).not.toContain('function useSwarmPermissionPoller(')
// The file-based processResponse must not exist
expect(content).not.toContain('function processResponse(')
})
test('poller does not import from permissionSync', async () => {
const content = await file(
'hooks/useSwarmPermissionPoller.ts',
).text()
// Must not import anything from permissionSync — all file-based
// functions have been removed from this module's dependencies
expect(content).not.toContain('permissionSync')
})
test('file-based permission functions are marked deprecated', async () => {
const content = await file(
'utils/swarm/permissionSync.ts',
).text()
// All file-based functions must have @deprecated JSDoc
const deprecatedFns = [
'writePermissionRequest',
'readPendingPermissions',
'readResolvedPermission',
'resolvePermission',
'pollForResponse',
'removeWorkerResponse',
]
for (const fn of deprecatedFns) {
// Find the function and check that @deprecated appears before it
const fnIndex = content.indexOf(`export async function ${fn}(`)
if (fnIndex === -1) continue // submitPermissionRequest is a const, not async function
const preceding = content.slice(Math.max(0, fnIndex - 500), fnIndex)
expect(preceding).toContain('@deprecated')
}
})
test('mailbox-based functions are NOT deprecated', async () => {
const content = await file(
'utils/swarm/permissionSync.ts',
).text()
// These are the active path — must not be deprecated
const activeFns = [
'sendPermissionRequestViaMailbox',
'sendPermissionResponseViaMailbox',
]
for (const fn of activeFns) {
const fnIndex = content.indexOf(`export async function ${fn}(`)
expect(fnIndex).not.toBe(-1)
const preceding = content.slice(Math.max(0, fnIndex - 300), fnIndex)
expect(preceding).not.toContain('@deprecated')
}
})
})