- Sanitize MCP tool result text with recursivelySanitizeUnicode() to prevent
Unicode injection via malicious MCP servers (tool definitions and prompts
were already sanitized, but tool call results were not)
- Read sandbox.enabled only from trusted settings sources (user, local, flag,
policy) — exclude projectSettings to prevent malicious repos from silently
disabling the sandbox via .claude/settings.json
- Disable git hooks in plugin marketplace clone/pull/submodule operations
with core.hooksPath=/dev/null to prevent code execution from cloned repos
- Remove ANTHROPIC_FOUNDRY_API_KEY from SAFE_ENV_VARS to prevent credential
injection from project-scoped settings without trust verification
- Add ssrfGuardedLookup to WebFetch HTTP requests to block DNS rebinding
attacks that could reach cloud metadata or internal services
Security: closes trust boundary gap where project settings could override
security-critical configuration. Follows the existing pattern established
by hasAllowBypassPermissionsMode() which already excludes projectSettings.
Co-authored-by: auriti <auriti@users.noreply.github.com>
- Introduced environment variable CLAUDE_CODE_USE_GITHUB to enable GitHub Models.
- Added checks for GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN for authentication.
- Updated base URL handling to include GitHub Models default.
- Enhanced provider detection and error handling for GitHub Models.
- Updated relevant functions and components to accommodate the new provider.
Squash the current repository state back into one baseline commit while
preserving the README reframing and repository contents.
Constraint: User explicitly requested a single squashed commit with subject "asdf"
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: broad
Reversibility: clean
Directive: This commit intentionally rewrites published history; coordinate before future force-pushes
Tested: git status clean; local history rewritten to one commit; force-pushed main to origin and instructkr
Not-tested: Fresh clone verification after push
