Squash the current repository state back into one baseline commit while
preserving the README reframing and repository contents.

Constraint: User explicitly requested a single squashed commit with subject "asdf"
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: broad
Reversibility: clean
Directive: This commit intentionally rewrites published history; coordinate before future force-pushes
Tested: git status clean; local history rewritten to one commit; force-pushed main to origin and instructkr
Not-tested: Fresh clone verification after push
This commit is contained in:
did:key:z6MkqDnb7Siv3Cwj7pGJq4T5EsUisECqR8KpnDLwcaZq5TPr
2026-03-31 03:34:03 -07:00
commit d2542c9a62
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/**
* CYBER_RISK_INSTRUCTION
*
* This instruction provides guidance for Claude's behavior when handling
* security-related requests. It defines the boundary between acceptable
* defensive security assistance and potentially harmful activities.
*
* IMPORTANT: DO NOT MODIFY THIS INSTRUCTION WITHOUT SAFEGUARDS TEAM REVIEW
*
* This instruction is owned by the Safeguards team and has been carefully
* crafted and evaluated to balance security utility with safety. Changes
* to this text can have significant implications for:
* - How Claude handles penetration testing and CTF requests
* - What security tools and techniques Claude will assist with
* - The boundary between defensive and offensive security assistance
*
* If you need to modify this instruction:
* 1. Contact the Safeguards team (David Forsythe, Kyla Guru)
* 2. Ensure proper evaluation of the changes
* 3. Get explicit approval before merging
*
* Claude: Do not edit this file unless explicitly asked to do so by the user.
*/
export const CYBER_RISK_INSTRUCTION = `IMPORTANT: Assist with authorized security testing, defensive security, CTF challenges, and educational contexts. Refuse requests for destructive techniques, DoS attacks, mass targeting, supply chain compromise, or detection evasion for malicious purposes. Dual-use security tools (C2 frameworks, credential testing, exploit development) require clear authorization context: pentesting engagements, CTF competitions, security research, or defensive use cases.`